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On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of
Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare.
Edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman. Quantico,
VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020. ISBN
9781732003149 (paperback). 452 pages.
Review Essay by John P. Sullivan and Hal Kempfer
Amphibious operations have been a significant component of warfare
since classical times. Much of the world relies upon maritime connections
or sea lines of communications, and maritime forces have long been used
to project power and ensure security. As we write this two of the world’s
major powers the United States and the United Kingdom are renewing the
amphibious focus of the marine forces: the United States Marine Corps1
and Royal Marine Commandos2 while China’s People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) is building amphibious capabilities to assert Chinese
hegemony throughout the South China Sea and beyond.3
On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the
History of Warfare looks at the significance of amphibious operations
over time and points to their continued relevance in the future. It is edited
by Timothy Heck, an artillery officer with an MA in war studies from
King’s College, London and B.A. Friedman, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
officer with an MA in national security and strategic studies from the U.S.
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. They start the inquiry into
amphibious warfare in their introduction stating, “The projection of
power from the sea, be it for conquest or humanitarian assistance, remains
a core task for militaries worldwide” (p. 3).
They note that for most casual observers—and many historians and
strategists—amphibious operations are viewed through the lens of
Gallipoli, Tarawa, or Normandy (p. 3). Indeed D-Day, the Normandy
Landings or Operation Overlord, starting 6 June 1944 epitomizes
amphibious warfare. Yet, for many the complex integration of naval forces
seen in Operation Neptune (the naval preparation and operations that
enabled the landings) are overtaken by images of the airborne and
amphibious assaults by U.S. forces at Utah and Omaha Beach, British
forces at Sword and Gold, and Canadians at Juno. For U.S. Marines, the
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Pacific campaign characterized by amphibious assaults at Guadalcanal and
Iwo Jima—among many others during the island-hopping campaigns—
resonate.4
The text contains a forward by Brigadier General Jason Q. Bohm, USMC, a
preface by the editors, a glossary of terms and acronyms, and the editors’
introduction which charts the course for the exploration of amphibious
operations over time. Here the editors specify that there are currently five
types of amphibious operations in U.S. doctrine. These are the assault, the
withdrawal, the raid, the demonstration, and finally amphibious support
to other operations (p. 5). The assault as previously mentioned dominates
the conceptual landscape. As the text amply asserts that has not been and
will not be the only focus of amphibious operations in the future.
On Contested Shores describes the application (and utility) of these
various types of amphibious operations in twenty-three chapters, followed
by a short conclusion by Heck and Friedman. The text includes seventyfive figures (images, map, and charts) that help bring context to the case
studies discussed, and a listing of selected readings on amphibious
operations. While amphibious operations are expected to continue in
relevance—albeit in updated and morphed form—it has been a longstanding tradition to claim they are obsolete. The editors recount General
Omar Bradley’s 1949 forecast that there would never be another largescale amphibious operation by reminding us that American forces defied
that projection and landed at Inchon, South Korea in less than a year (p.
6).5

Case Studies: Chapters One–Nine
Chapters One–Nine span the period from the late 16th Century (1555) to
the Gallipoli Campaign during World War I in the early 20th (1915-1916).
First, Jacopo Pessina, an Italian scholar, looks at an amphibious special
operation in Tuscany on 2 June 1555 in Chapter One. Here a Florentine
force conducted a night assault against a French-Sienese garrison at Porto
Ercole, Tuscany. The operation confirms the importance of information
collection (what we now call geospatial intelligence) and espionage in
mission planning (p. 23). Ultimately, the assault’s success was ensured
through surprise and the use of “skilled skirmishers” (p. 24).
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In Chapter Two, Samuel de Korte, at Utrecht University, examines the
1575 Siege of Leiden. This engagement during the Eighty Years War
involved creative exploitation of terrain, in this case flooding the land
surrounding Leiden (inundation tactics) (p. 37) to force invading Spanish
forces to retreat. Chapter Three looks at the foundations of British
Amphibious Doctrine during the Seven Years War (1756-63). Here,
Andrew Young, a former Royal Navy officer engaged in doctoral studies in
naval history at King’s College London, recounts the role of Thomas More
Molyneux in formulating amphibious doctrine with emphasis on his 1759
text Conjunct Expeditions (p. 39). The main lesson extracted from this
chapter is the importance of sea control in enabling littoral maneuver.
Without at least total local command of the sea the ability to “launch,
sustain, or recover operations ashore” (p. 53) is compromised.
The Delaware River Campaign of 1777 by historian James R. McIntyre is
the topic of Chapter Four, which looks at 18th Century amphibious
operations during the Revolutionary War. This campaign demonstrated
the importance of what we now call “jointness” or unity of effort between
naval and land forces with the application of unified command augmented
by institutionalized amphibious experience (pp. 71-72). The British
ultimately won the campaign due to these factors. The one exception—
which helps prove the value of unified command and operations—was seen
in the attack on Fort Mercer where the basic principles of joint operations
were ignored. Once those precepts were reestablished the British went on
to win the campaign.
Vera Cruz, 1847 is the case study examined by J. Overton, a U.S. Navy
civilian who served as an adjunct professor at the Naval War College and
Marine Command and Staff College, in Chapter Five. The MexicanAmerican War provides the backdrop for this landing. The operation
(Battle of Veracruz) involved a siege of Veracruz, a seaport city, under the
overall command of Major General Winfield Scott. Navy Commodores
David E. Conner and later Matthew C. Perry U.S. Navy operations. Vera
Cruz demonstrated the importance of a solid command understanding of
operational factors: time, forces, and space (p. 82).
In Chapter Six, “Courting Disaster,” Edward J. Hagerty, a historian who
served with the U.S. Air Force, recounts the Civil War Battle of Santa Rosa
Island (1861). Here confusion, a complete lack of mission training for
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amphibious operations, and lack of hydrological knowledge and
intelligence preparation denied the Confederate attackers under Brigadier
General Braxton Bragg victory. Bragg’s desire for action skewed his
risk/benefit analysis and poor planning led to his loss (pp. 104-105).
The importance of operational alignment with strategic goals is the lesson
of Chapter Seven on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps support of great power
competition in late 19th Century Korea. In this case, Benjamin Armstrong,
a naval officer and history professor at Annapolis and author of Small
Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the
Early American Navy,6 reminds the reader that tactical prowess and
victory does not ensure strategic success. Amphibious operations must
align with operational and strategic possibilities (p.124). Eric A. Sibil, an
historian who served at the NATO Baltic College, assesses Estonian
amphibious operations in the Baltic during the Estonian War of
Independence (1918-20) in Chapter Eight. He points out that amphibious
operations enhanced Estonian maneuver and allowed them to employ
surprise and engage Bolshevik and German forces in unexpected places
(pp. 125-146). Leadership and organizational skills were imperative and
outweighed the lack of extensive naval experience, although extensive
maritime skills and seamanship combined with flexibility were
instrumental in achieving operational success (p. 146).
Chapter Nine by Angus Murray, a doctoral student at the University of
Newcastle reviews the importance of Gallipoli7 on interwar U.S. Marine
Corps planning and doctrinal development. The U.S. Navy and Marines
used the interwar period to develop and exercise (and thus hone) new
amphibious skills. These efforts were instrumental in developing the
framework for amphibious operations in War Plan Orange (the strategy
for naval engagement that was realized in World War II in the Pacific.
Essentially study of Gallipoli—and its failures-—underscored USMC efforts
to develop meaningful amphibious capabilities and doctrine. General
Holland Smith acknowledged the importance of these efforts, including
Landing Operations Doctrine,8 that carried the Marines through “Tarawa,
Normandy, and Iwo Jima (p. 165).9
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Case Studies: Chapters Ten–Seventeen
Chapters Ten–Seventeen review amphibious operations during World War
II, with an additional examination of the lesser-known application of
amphibious operation almost three decades after that war by the Turks in
Cyprus (1974).
“Ambiguous Application: The Study of Amphibious Warfare in Marine
Corps Schools” by Bruce Gudmundson, who was educated at Oxford and
Parris Island, provided a unique insight into the development of doctrine
and professional thinking of amphibious operations and tactics leading up
to World War II and the Pacific Campaign in Chapter Ten. Chapter Eleven,
“Operation Weserubung: Early Amphibious Multidomain Operations” by
James K. Greer, an assistant professor at the school of Advanced Military
Studies, discussed early amphibious multidomain operations in Norway.
While the Norway campaign is not generally studied as closely as other
amphibious operations, it does present a unique window into modern
(post-WWI) doctrinal change in that the German’s integrated from
planning through execution a combined arms approach with air, sea and
land forces providing multi-domain “synergy” of mutually supporting
efforts.
Chapter Twelve, “The Reich Strikes Back: German Victory in the
Dodecanese, October-November 1943” by historian and political scientist
Jeffrey Schultz reveals that through superior application of amphibious
art, a strategically crippled Germany, losing on multiple fronts, was able to
thwart a British takeover of the Aegean in the wake of Italy’s surrender to
allied forces. While a relatively expensive effort for the Germans, for
arguably minor strategic gain, the Germans were able to leverage shorter
supply routes and an existing regional military presence that proved
decisive in defeating a less organized and largely dispersed British effort to
take these islands. It also demonstrated the German Navy’s ability to wage
amphibious warfare under disputed conditions. A well-executed
amphibious operation, even in context of other major setbacks across the
theater, can prove operationally successful with the right planning and
amalgamation of forces and tactics.
“Missing the Mark: Naval Gunfire Lessons from Tarawa,” Chapter
Thirteen by James P. McGrath III, an adjunct professor at the Naval War
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College documents the stark lessons learned at Tarawa where Navy
planners overpromised the effects of Naval gunfire without due regard to
Japanese preparations to mitigate that threat. In short, Naval Gunfire
underdelivered. While destroyers offshore provided some exemplary direct
fire support of Marine maneuver forces once ashore, proving the potential
value of this support while in contact with the enemy, the preparatory fires
were inadequate to achieve the operational advantage desired prior to
landings and the author does a good job explaining how this altered
thinking formed from interwar years, especially the Marine Corps
“Tentative Manual for Amphibious Operations” of 1934. While the price
was high, Tarawa did deliver profound lessons learned that were applied
in follow-on operations, although the success of Tarawa was summed up
by General Julian Smith, “We made fewer mistakes than the [Japanese]
did (p. 239).”10
“Soviet Strategic Attack and Tactical Amphibious Failure in the Merkula in
1941,” Chapter Fourteen by Andre Del Guadio, a retired Marine infantry
officer, reinforces the need close coordination of air, sea, and land forces,
and why such operations must be rehearsed at all echelons to ensure
successful amphibious operations. The chapter outlines how the Soviets
rushed into this this most difficult of military operations, believing the
tactical advantage before them somehow overcame the need for proper
preparation and coordination, and they paid a huge price for the ensuing
failure. Merkula went from a being a strategic opportunity, to the Soviets
to devolving into an “operational diversion to be dealt with harshly at the
water’s edge by the Germans (p. 252).”
“Learning the Lessons of Port-en-Bessin, 1944,” Chapter Fifteen by John
D. Salt, a lecturer at Cranfield University, is a testament to the superior
quality of British Marine Royal Marine Commandos compared to their
German counterparts, and that this played a critical role in overcoming a
series of operational setbacks that would have likely discouraged lesser
capable, disciplined, and well led military forces.
Chapter Sixteen, “German Naval Evacuations of the Eastern Front, 194445” by Gregory Liedtke, a historian specializing in German military
history, provides a review of a lesser-known amphibious evacuation of
German forces on the Eastern Front, in Crimea. It points to the larger
strategic problem of Hitler’s reluctance to withdraw forces, pushing the
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German 17th Army into a position where there was no other option but to
withdraw via the sea. Despite heavy losses, the operation was considered a
success. It also points to the role that the Romanian Navy played with the
German Navy in enabling this success. Of note, pockets of German forces
supplied by the sea tied up much larger Soviet forces until nearly the end
of the war, making this a remarkable story about economy of force actions,
and the importance of amphibious support to forces cut off from ground
supply lines.
“Against All Odds: Turkish Amphibious Operation in Cyprus, 20-23 July
1974,” Chapter Seventeen by Turkish scholars Serhat Guveng and Menut
Uyar recounts a poorly planned and executed amphibious operation that
has all the hallmarks of a tactical failure even though it is generally seen as
successful operationally. The chapter explores the history and respective
orders of battle between the opposing forces in Cyprus, and particularly
the political dynamics surrounding this operation. What makes this so
remarkable is that both sides (Greece and Turkey) are NATO members,
and that this action did not result in either leaving NATO or having to
leave NATO. It also points to the fact that the Turks had no real experience
in conducting amphibious operations prior to 1974, and that it was
arguably the most complex campaign ever conducted by Turkish armed
forces anywhere.

The Future: Chapters Eighteen–Twenty-Three
Chapters Eighteen–Twenty-Three peer into the future of amphibious
operations to discern the need for critical doctrinal changes. The Role of
Amphibious Operations within the Multidomain Operational Construct
Background and Considerations,” Chapter Eighteen by Keith D. Dickson, a
professor at the National Defense University, discusses the transition to
Multidomain Operational (MDO) doctrine from what had previous been
called Air-Sea Battle. It draws from Joint Operating Environment 2035,
wherein future confrontation will be part of “antagonistic geopolitical
balancing” (p. 331). It proclaims that, “MDO outlines an agile force
reacting responding, initiating, aggregating, and disaggregating and
capable of multidomain convergence, all without loss of momentum” (p.
328).
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“The Future is Amphibious: The Role of Naval Special Warfare in the
Great Power Competition,” Chapter Nineteen by Shulakshana Komerath,
at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, encapsulates an ongoing
discussion within the Naval Special Warfare community as it transitions
from two decades of counterterrorism (e.g., ground conflict) to providing
critical support in conflict and confrontation with near-peer competitors.
Figure 6.7 on page 333 provides a very simple but powerful example of this
transition of skillsets and missions from the ground to the maritime
domains, but also the unique “amphibious” zone where they overlap, and
an area where this new era of great power competition is likely to see more
utilization of the Naval Special Warfare capabilities being applied. It also
mentions the need for a more “holistic approach to intelligence gathering,
maintaining awareness of the battlespace, and keeping military as well as
well as political and economic tools available to manage the GPC [Great
Power Competition] rivalry” (p. 338-9).
“Uncertainty, Maskirovka, and Militarism: Russian Perspectives and
Amphibious Assault Potential in the Arctic Near Future,” Chapter Twenty
by Ellen A. Allness, an Arctic military affairs specialist, explores Russia’s
changing Arctic capabilities and intentions. The Arctic has the potential to
become a flashpoint due to lack of surveillance capabilities in the region.
In short, it is too far north. Meaning that practicing deception in this
region is very easy, making strategic surprise more likely. Chapter
Twenty-One, “Naval Strategy and the Future of Amphibious Operations,
by B.A. Friedman lays out the fundamental challenges to conducting
amphibious operations in today’s precision long-range munitions
environment, with the detrimental impact this has on classic amphibious
force landings, but it also lays out the increasing role for other kinds of
amphibious operations to counter this threat, such as raids.
“The United Kingdom’s Approach to Amphibious Operations: From the
Cold War to the Information Age,” Chapter Twenty-Two by Kevin
Rowlands, a Royal Navy Captain, explains how the UK’s approach to
amphibious operations has changed, much of that due to a lack of
amphibious shipping needed for large-scale force projection ashore.
Modern amphibious forces may be smaller but more specialized, focused
on the challenging mission of maritime area denial. While they adhere to
NATO doctrine (p. 371), they can also deliver “lasting effects whether in
acting in conflict, capability building, or humanitarian assistance” (p. 371).
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Chapter Twenty-Three, “The Marine Corps and Advanced Base
Operations: Past, Present and Future” by Marine infantry officer Walker
D. Mills provides a detailed analysis of seizing advanced naval bases. It
explores the past, present, and future of advanced bases and the
importance of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) (p. 385) networks in the
various oceans and seas worldwide, emphasizing that land-based missiles
ore a critical component of Chinese A2/AD strategy.

Conclusion
In their conclusion, Freidman and Heck remind us that amphibious
warfare is characterized by both continuity and change. At its core, it
involved the projection of combat power from the sea to the shore (p. 393).
As the entirety of their edited collection confirms, amphibious operations
are more than amphibious assaults. They include a range of littoral
operations, including raids, special operations, humanitarian support
actions, and yes: large scale amphibious assaults. From the Peloponnesian
War (and likely before) to the present, amphibious operations allowed
rivals to project military force from the sea to shore.11 Sea power was an
integral component of classical Mediterranean wars. As John Nash, an
Australian naval officer and classical scholar noted, sea power in the
Peloponnesian war spanned the full spectrum of maritime operations.
These include what is known categorized in Australian maritime doctrine
as military, diplomatic, and constabulary (policing operations).12
As Sulakshana Komerath noted in Chapter Nineteen, contemporary naval
special warfare capabilities embrace amphibious operations to achieve
special reconnaissance, infiltration/exfiltration, clandestine intelligence
collection, amphibious assault, and sabotage operations (p. 333). As B.A.
Freidman reminded us in Chapter Twenty-One, this involves the “return of
the raid or “Guerre de Razzia” (p. 359-362). The future of amphibious
operations will be complicated by the urban littoral where urban warfare
and littoral operations in a contested environment (LOCE) converge.13 As
Dayton McCarthy noted in his Australian Army Occasional Paper, the
urban littoral is “the worst of both worlds.”14 In addition, robotic warfare
(ghost fleets),15 drones, (aerial unmanned aerial systems–UAS, unmanned
surface vessels–USV, unmanned underwater vessels–UUV, and
unmanned ground vehicles–UGV), along with artificial intelligence (AI),
124
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 4

AI-enabled sensors, pulsing and swarms will both complicate the
environment and bring new capabilities to both offensive and defensive
forces.16 All of these will require concerted efforts to explore new
approaches through wargaming and development of robust intelligence
capabilities.17
As a compendium of smaller works, the text provides a broad overview of
many different topics tied to history, strategy, operations, tactics, doctrine,
and major changes in amphibious operations. It also provides a view that
looks well beyond other more U.S.-centric works, and while it addresses
many of the more well-known amphibious operations, it tends to focus on
those particular operations that provide key doctrinal lessons or where
those operations proved to be a strategic inflection point in how strategy
and tactics suddenly shifted thereafter. For any serious student of
amphibious warfare this book is an invaluable reference guide. On
Contested Shores is a valuable contribution to the naval and military
literature on amphibious warfare and operations. Strategists will also
benefit from its lessons as they consider future maritime and amphibious
operations. Hopefully, this collection will stimulate new discussion and
doctrinal development for the amphibious operations of the future.
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